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Abstract 
 
The role of whistle-blowing as a mechanism for deterring corruption has been 
conspicuously neglected in the economic literature. This is quite surprising given the increase in 
legislation aimed at preventing corruption that includes whistle-blowing clauses and the 
extensive literature on whistle-blowing outside economics. In fact, we know of no formal 
economic model that deals squarely with the analysis of the role and potential impact of whistle-
blowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations. Therefore, in an attempt to at least 
partially fill this gap, we present a theoretical model for approaching the issue, focusing 
specifically on the role of economic incentives to encourage whistle-blowing behaviour. We 
model corruption as a social norm of behaviour using elements of evolutionary game theory 
(EGT). We use the concept of replicator dynamics to explore the local asymptotical stability of 
several types of behaviour within organizations: (i) honest, corrupt, and honest whistle-blowing 
and (ii) honest, corrupt whistle-blowing, and honest whistle-blowing. 
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On The Economics of Whistle-Blowing Behaviour: The Role of Incentives 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently, the economics of corruption has given rise to a vast body of theoretical and 
empirical literature.1 However, the role of whistle-blowing as a deterrence mechanism against 
corruption has been conspicuously neglected in the literature. This is quite surprising regarding 
the increase in legislation aimed at preventing corruption that includes whistle-blowing clauses2 
and the extensive literature on whistle-blowing outside economics.3 We know of no formal 
economic model that deals squarely with the analysis of the role and potential impact of whistle-
blowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations. Therefore, in an attempt to at least 
partially fill this gap, we present a theoretical model for approaching the issue, focusing 
specifically on the role of economic incentives aimed at encouraging whistle-blowing behaviour. 
A quick look at a real life case study will help clarify the nature of whistle-blowing and our 
modelling strategy. In Canada in the mid-1990s, the Liberal Party implemented a federal 
“sponsorship programme” in Quebec Province in an attempt to increase awareness of the 
government’s contributions to Quebec and discourage its separatism, as promoted by the 
provincial government (Parti Québécois). This programme lasted from 1996 until 2004, when 
corruption was exposed and its operations came under investigation by the Gomery Commission4. 
The allegations of corruption in the programme management referred mainly to payments of 
commissions for no apparent services and improper advances made to agencies related to the 
Liberal Party. These accusations focused on firms favoured by the sponsorship programme that 
maintained Liberal organizers or fundraisers on their payrolls or donated back part of the money 
to the Liberal Party. For years, this was an ongoing affair until Allan Cutler, a civil servant 
working for the Ministry of Public Works and Government Services, lodged a complaint that 
prompted a departmental audit of the advertising and public opinion division. Cutler was the 
whistle-blower who detected and reported the anomalies in the Canadian sponsorship programme 
and his actions triggered the so called “Sponsorgate” or “AdScam” scandal. 
                                                
1 For a survey of theoretical works see: Aidt (2003); for empirical works see: Bardhan (1997) and Jain (2001). 
2 See, for example, Groeneweg (2001) for a review of the distinct whistle-blower protection models of Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
3 See, for instance, Elliston (1985), Glazer and Glazer (1989), Jos and Tompkins (1989), Miceli and Near (1992), Clark 
(1997), Hunt (1997), Jubb (1999), Miethe (1999), and Alford (2001). 
4 Formally: the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Programme and Advertising Activities. 
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Some interesting questions arise from this specific case. How did the corrupt activities 
committed in the context of the sponsorship programme go on for such a long time without being 
detected or reported? It is highly unlikely that this programme could have functioned for years 
without any other public official involved in it not knowing about the illicit and even illegal 
activities committed within the administration of the programme. Why did they not denounce 
these activities? Were all public officials working in the programme corrupt? Finally, if public 
officials from inside the organization were unable or unwilling to report the corrupt activities, 
how did these activities escape detection by external enforcement agencies? 
Although these questions are based on the specific case of the Canadian sponsorship 
programme scandal, they apply to many other situations in developed as well as developing 
countries where persistent corrupt activities in public as well as private organizations are 
discovered and sanctioned only after a whistle-blower reports them to the authorities and the 
anomalies are made public.5 
One element to consider here is that spontaneous whistle-blowing behaviour can be difficult 
to initiate in practice because it implies costly activities and typically garners no economic 
rewards (Heyes and Kapur, 2008). The costs of whistle-blowing include monitoring and 
transaction costs associated with actually reporting a corrupt individual. Clearly, these costs 
depend on the number of agents within the organization that somehow favour the corrupt 
activities being committed. Indeed, the monitoring and transaction costs of reporting illicit 
activities can increase as more people within the organization support this type of behaviour. 
Thus, one way to approach this problem is to model corruption as a social norm of behaviour, 
assuming that the illicit activities are somehow accepted by most agents as valid and common 
practices, so that going against them means going against the majority (see, for instance, Stephan, 
2008; and Davis, 1999). 
                                                
5 Recent events in Chile provide an example in the context of a developing country. At the end of 2007, widespread 
corruption was discovered in Chile Deportes, the government’s sports organization. Nearly 90% of Chile Deportes 
projects had some type of anomaly (e.g., initiatives that were never started, false and nonexistent identities). It was later 
discovered that much of the money that went to the Valparaíso Region Chile Deportes branch was used to finance 
political campaigns of members of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy, the governing political alliance: more often 
known as the Concertación, this alliance has been in power since 1990. Jorge Schaulsohn, founder and former president 
of the Party for Democracy, was one of the first whistle-blowers to report this type of corrupt activity in the 
Concertación. In a press interview, Schaulsohn argued that, during the time he presided over his party, all four parties 
in the Concertación coalition received money from the government. Additionally, Schaulsohn reported that government 
money had also been used to directly finance the campaigns of Concertación candidates. He accused the government 
and the Concertación of an “ideology of corruption”. He was later expelled from the Party for Democracy. 
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By analytically approaching corruption as a social norm, we can infer the following 
regularities. First, as seen in practice and as the economic literature on social norms recognizes, 
once a social norm has been established, it is very difficult to break.6 Since most employees may 
be following a social norm of behaviour by not reporting corrupt activities, it can be very hard for 
any external enforcing agency to detect and sanction these practices. Consequently, corrupt 
activities can go on for many years without being detected. Second, given this inability of 
external enforcing agencies to detect corrupt behaviour within organizations, an inside whistle-
blower is typically required to report these activities, thereby revealing the corrupt actions to the 
public. Third, since most of the employees may be complying with the established norm of 
behaviour, denouncing the illicit activities can be costly and typically implies punishments for 
whistle-blowers (e.g., ostracism; retaliation, including being fired from the organization; or even 
physical violence). In the case of the sponsorship scandal, Allan Cutler, the whistle-blower who 
lodged the complaint that triggered the departmental audit, was transferred to the technical and 
special services division of Public Works by the time the audit was underway and was later fired 
by the Canadian government. 
If we assume that the whistle-blowing individuals are honest (do not accept bribes), it is clear 
that no payoff maximiser agent will be a whistle-blower, since this activity will only lower her 
payoff regardless of the whistle-blowing behaviour of the others. This implies that, in order to 
study this phenomenon, a non-optimising framework is typically required. This could explain, at 
least partially, the little attention that whistle-blowing behaviour has received in the theoretical 
economic literature on corruption.7 
Some exceptions are the recent theoretical works by Søreide (2008) and Heyes and Kapur 
(2008). Søreide (2008) presents an economic framework for explaining the potential reaction of 
multinationals to the loss of a contract because a competitor has offered a bribe. In particular, the 
author examines the impact of industry structure and institutional quality on the company’s 
incentive to react against corruption. The paper assumes a homogenous output in a standard 
Cournot competition framework, considering in different contexts the potential costs and benefits 
of a firm’ whistleblowing behaviour. That study concludes, first, that firms will not react against a 
case of business corruption if it may disturb their opportunities to obtain cartel profits, and, 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Chapter 7 of Bowles (2004) and the many references presented therein. 
7 In a similar line, Heyes and Kapur (2008: 4) argue: “The biggest hurdle in modeling whistle-blowing—and perhaps a 
reason why the phenomenon has not proven amenable to economic analysis—follows directly from…the adopted 
definition. If the benefits from the activity accrue, by definition, to others and not the whistle-blower, such behavior is 
not easily incorporated under conventional assumptions about rational, self-interested agents.” 
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second, the more efficient the offender of the crime, the lower the motivation for the potential 
whistle-blower to react. Finally, the reaction of a whistle-blower to corruption can trigger other 
obstacles if there are connections between local politicians and firms in the given market. 
The behavioural model of Heyes and Kapur (2008) adopts, in particular, the methods of 
behavioural law and economics. These authors put forward a general whistle-blower “motivation 
function,” which relates whistle-blower propensity to the characteristics of the observed 
malfeasance and the enforcement environment. Heyes and Kapur (2008) rely on evidence from 
sociology and psychology to explain why employees blow the whistle on law-breaking employers 
even though it is not within their narrowly defined self-interest. The authors identify three 
alternative “schools of thought”, adapt the general motivation function to correspond to each 
school, and then characterize the optimal policy in each case. Their main conclusions are, first, 
that optimal policy varies substantially between cases and, second, the value of the information 
that whistle-blowers bring to the enforcement agency, and what the agency will wish to do with 
that information, depend upon the motives ascribed to the whistle-blowers. Finally, in adjusting 
the enforcement instruments, attention has to be paid to the change induced in the flow of 
disclosures, in addition to the direct effect on compliance incentives. In this case, the quantitative 
and qualitative response will also depend upon whistle-blower motives. 
Our work is related to that of Heyes and Kapur (2008), as we also study the whistle-blowing 
behaviour of individuals within an organization but not firms’ reactions, as does Søreide (2008). 
Nonetheless, we differ from these other articles in several respects. 
First, unlike these works, we explicitly model the role and impact of whistle-blowing 
behaviour on the stability of corruption. Thus, our work is also related to those of Lui (1986), 
Cadot (1987), Sah (1988), Andvig and Moene (1990), Murphy et al. (1991; 1993), Acemoglu 
(1995), and Tirole (1996), who also emphasize the self-reinforcing nature of corruption, implying 
that the more people adhere to corrupt activities, the more persistent, or stable, corruption 
becomes. Nevertheless, including whistle-blowing behaviour in the analysis allows us to consider 
additional control instruments for the organization to prevent corruption, going beyond the usual 
variables mentioned in the economic literature (namely, the wage rate, the monitoring system or 
probability that an external enforcing agency will detect a corrupt individual, and penalties for 
corrupt activities). We attempt to answer these specific questions in this context: How can the 
number of whistle-blowers be increased in an organization with an initially small population of 
individuals who are willing to monitor and report corrupt behaviour? What additional control 
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instruments should be considered in order to motivate and promote whistle-blowing behaviour in 
an organization? Furthermore, when corruption already exists as a social norm of behaviour in an 
organization, how can whistle-blowing policies help end the stability of corruption? 
In particular, our work adds to the analysis three variables related to the whistle-blowing 
environment within organizations: the role of the transaction costs associated with reporting a 
corrupt individual, the costs of monitoring, and the economic incentives for whistle-blowers that 
effectively detect and sanction a corrupt agent. These economic variables can all be very 
important as additional control mechanisms to promote whistle-blowing behaviour and fight 
corruption, but their potential effect on the stability of corruption is not so clear. Thus, we wonder 
(and address herein): What would happen to the stability of corruption if the mechanisms used to 
promote whistle-blowing also incite corrupt players to “blow the whistle”? Will corrupt whistle-
blowers contribute to break the stability of corruption or they will only add to the stability of this 
social norm of behaviour? How should economic instruments aimed at promoting whistle-
blowing behaviour be designed so that they will effectively help break the stability of corruption 
rather than contribute to its stability within the organization? To the best of our knowledge, no 
specific work deals with the impact that economic incentives for whistle-blowers have on the 
stability of corruption. Consequently, this article deals with how the stability of corruption would 
be affected by having, or not having, these instruments. Furthermore, we analyse the effects of 
economic incentives on the stability of corruption considering not only honest whistle-blowers 
within an organization, but also corrupt whistle-blowers.8 
Second, unlike the earlier literature, our approach to modelling social norms is based on 
evolutionary game theory (EGT)9, which does not assume optimising behaviour per se, but does 
retain the idea that individuals adjust their behaviour in response to persistent differentials in 
material incentives. Hence, although economic agents do pursue individual material payoffs, 
which, in these models, represent evolutionary success, they are not always in a position to obtain 
straightaway the payoffs an optimising agent would obtain. This is because social norms of 
behaviour restrict the course of action of individuals in such a way as to prevent them from 
adjusting their behaviour towards the optimal strategy immediately (it takes time to change a 
social norm followed by the majority of the population). 
                                                
8 Heyes and Kapur (2008) also recognise this point, suggesting that a way to expand their model of whistleblower 
policy would be: “to explore the role played by whistle-blower regards or bounties”. 
9 For further details about evolutionary game theory, see inter alia: Van Damme (1994), Vega-Redondo (1996), 
Weibull (1996), Samuelson (1997), and Villena and Villena (2004). 
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However, if this situation persists in time, some individuals will start adopting the more 
efficient strategy and will, therefore, receive a higher payoff than the rest of the population. In the 
long run, the rest of the population will start imitating this more profitable course of action. Thus, 
the incumbent social norm will be replaced by a new, more successful strategy that, in time, will 
be adopted as the new norm of behaviour in the population. This alternative EGT-based approach 
allows us to analyse the impact of different initial population shares ascribing to whistle-blowing 
behaviour within an organization and the relevance of history and initial conditions when 
explaining the stability of corruption. 
Finally, unlike preceding works, we model corruption by assuming three basic types of 
behaviour within an organization: (i) honest behaviour, which implies that an individual does not 
receive any bribe from illicit activity; (ii) corrupt behaviour, in which case an individual does 
receive a bribe from a corrupt relationship; and (iii) whistle-blowing (honest-enforcer) behaviour, 
with an agent who not only behaves honestly (i.e., does not receive bribes), but also monitors 
other people within the organization and reports them if they are behaving corruptly. Assuming 
that an organization includes three different population shares pursuing these three alternative 
behaviour types, we use the concept of replicator dynamics to analyse which population share 
will become stable within the organization in the long run. In other words, we formally explore 
the asymptotical stability of the non-corruption equilibrium (all individuals behave honestly) and 
the corruption equilibrium (all individuals behave corruptly). We also extend this basic model to 
include cases in which corrupt individuals also ascribe to whistle-blowing behaviour. In order to 
model this type of behaviour, we modify the previous strategic setting by assuming that the 
organization encompasses a proportion of honest individuals, another of corrupt whistle-blowing 
individuals, and another of honest whistle-blowing individuals. 
Section 2 of this paper describes the basic economic model and its results are given in 
Section 3. In Section 4, we set forward an extension of the basic model, and Section 5 presents 
some concluding remarks and related topics for future research. 
 
2. The Model 
While the model we present in this work is quite general and can be applied to several 
contexts, in order to ease the exposition henceforth we consider the case of a public organization. 
We assume that there exists an infinitely elastic demand for corrupt services and that individuals 
or firms interested in buying these services can buy them at a price of 0>! , the value of the 
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bribe paid to a public servant. Clearly, for these bribes to be paid by rational individuals, the 
expected benefits obtained from corrupt services must be higher than the expected costs. In this 
context, we can think of corrupt services as the action, vote, or influence of a person in an 
official or public capacity in order to, for instance, bypass laws and regulations, obtain 
government contracts, acquire state-owned property, etc. In any case, the cost of the bribery 
should be lower than the costs associated with obtaining the services lawfully; otherwise rational 
individuals would not buy corrupt services. 
On the supply side, we assume that there exist a number of bureaucrats that may offer 
corrupt services. Suppose that, whereas honest bureaucrats earn the wagew , corrupt bureaucrats 
earn the same wage w  plus the amount of the bribery, 0>! . Now, let us assume that the 
government, through an external enforcing agency, for example, can detect a corrupt public 
official within a specific governmental organization with probability! . Whenever the bureaucrat 
is detected by the government, she will be fired and have to go to work in the private sector, 
where she can get a wage
0
0w ! . In addition, the corrupt bureaucrat will also have to pay a 
penalty 0f ! . 
Clearly, in many real life situations, as those discussed in the introduction, it can be very 
hard for the government to detect corrupt government officials. In terms of our model, we can 
argue that there are typically a great number of bureaucrats; even more firms being regulated, 
applying for government contracts, bidding on state-owned property, etc.; and limited resources 
for monitoring and auditing both public officials and firms. But even if the government had a 
great deal of resources with which to investigate, the important informational advantage of public 
officials can make it too expensive to completely eliminate corruption from the system. Indeed, 
designing an effective control and monitoring system can be both difficult and costly, which may 
imply a very low ! . Here, given these contexts, the role of whistle-blowing can be very 
important. 
Assume, for instance, that there are some whistle-blowing bureaucrats that monitor others 
and denounce them to the government if found in an illicit activity, for instance providing corrupt 
services to private firms. If a whistle-blowing bureaucrat can detect a corrupt public official 
within her own organization with probability! , this probability being greater than the 
probability of detection by an external enforcing agency, that is !" > , then the expected gains 
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from corrupt activities decrease in comparison with the baseline scenario of no whistle-blowing 
bureaucrats in the organization. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult for whistle-blowing behaviour to arise spontaneously. As we 
already discussed in the introduction, this is because the whistle-blowing strategy is a costly 
activity. The costs associated with whistle-blowing behaviour include monitoring costs,m 0! , 
and the transaction costs associated with actually reporting a public official to the government, 
0! > . If we assume that the whistle-blowing bureaucrats are honest, in the sense that they do not 
accept bribes from private firms for instance, it is clear that no payoff maximiser agent will be a 
whistle-blower, since this activity will only lower her payoff regardless of the whistle-blowing 
behaviour of the rest. In fact, in this case, the whistle-blowing strategy is strictly dominated by 
the honest strategy( w w m )!"> # # , so no honest bureaucrat will have incentives to become a 
whistle-blower. This, in turn, implies that no bureaucrat will be deterred from corruption by the 
threat of whistle-blowing behaviour from her colleagues. 
 
2.1 The Evolutionary Game Population Dynamics 
We now adopt an approach based on an evolutionary game theoretic framework that 
allows us to model corruption as a social norm of behaviour. In terms of the specific strategies 
pursued by the bureaucrats, in this case, norms of behaviour, we suppose that within the 
government there is a proportion of honest bureaucrats, another of corrupt bureaucrats, and 
another of whistle-blowing  (honest-enforcer) bureaucrats, which we denote 
1
p , 
2
p , and 3p , 
respectively. Considering a total population of n  public officials and given the population shares 
i
p  at any point in time, it is assumed that each of the np
1
 honest bureaucrats receives the payoff 
associated with honest behaviour, namely the wage w . 
By contrast, the np
2
 corrupt bureaucrats receive the expected payoff associated with 
corrupt behaviour, namely ( )( ) ( )( )01 w w f! " !# + + # . In addition, they also perceive the 
expected costs of being detected by the whistle-blowing bureaucrats and reported to the 
government. The corrupt bureaucrats are monitored by the np
3
 whistle-blowing bureaucrats, and 
so they can be sanctioned by the government if one of these agents catches the bureaucrat in a 
corrupt relationship. Herein, we assume that a corrupt bureaucrat will meet a whistle-blowing 
bureaucrat with probability 3p  and that the latter will detect and report a corrupt agent with 
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probabilityΘ. Hence, the net expected payoff associated with the corrupt strategy becomes 
! 
"
2
= 1#$ # p
3
%( ) w + &( ) + $ + p3%( ) wo # f( ) . 
Finally, each of the np3  whistle-blowing bureaucrats receives the payoff associated with 
honest behaviour, namely wage w  (we relax this assumption later). The costs associated with 
monitoring and reporting a corrupt bureaucrat are the transaction costs associated with reporting a 
colleague to the government, 0! > , and the monitoring costs, denoted by m 0> , which we 
assume in this context to be an increasing function of the proportion of corrupt bureaucrats, 
2
p , 
that is ( )2m p 0! , with 
( )2
2
dm p
0
dp
>  and ( )m 0 0= .10 This last assumption is consistent with 
previous works on corruption that suppose that it is harder to audit corrupt officials in societies 
where corruption is more prevalent (Lui, 1986; Cadot, 1987; Andvig and Moene, 1990). 
We also include here a reward for the whistle-blowing bureaucrats subject to the effective 
detection and sanction of a corrupt agent, denoted by 0! " . This reward can be thought of as 
any incentive given by the government to bureaucrats for monitoring the work done by their 
colleagues and reporting illicit acts. We analyse what happens in terms of the stability of the 
corruption and non-corruption equilibria if this mechanism is in place and if it is not. Hence, if a 
whistle-blowing bureaucrat will meet a corrupt agent with probability
2
p , and will detect and 
report her with probabilityΘ, the net expected gains for whistle-blowing  bureaucrats are: 
( ) ( )3 2 2w p m p! " # $= + % % . The payoffs for each strategy type, given the population 
composition, are therefore: 
 
(1) 
1
w! =  
(2) 
! 
"
2
= 1#$ # p
3
%( ) w + &( ) + $ + p3%( ) wo # f( )  
(3) ( ) ( )3 2 2w p m p! " # $= + % %  
 
                                                
10 We assume that to actually report a corrupt bureaucrat, individuals who choose the whistle blowing strategy must 
develop monitoring activities. However, monitoring is costly. Agents that monitor must spend time, for instance, 
investigating and proving suspicious behaviour, accusations, etc. and might also face other costs like verbal violence 
and threats from the group of corrupt agents. These costs are likely to increase along with the fraction of the population 
that is behaving corruptly. 
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Equations (1), (2), and (3) clearly show that, if there are no corrupt bureaucrats 
( )2p 0= , honest bureaucrats will perform as well as whistle-blowing bureaucrats. By contrast, if 
corrupt bureaucrats are present in the population, the whistle-blowing strategy is weakly 
dominated by the honest strategy whenever the transaction costs associated with reporting a 
public official to the government are larger or equal to the monetary reward for detecting and 
sanctioning a corrupt bureaucrat, that is ! "# . 
Let us now formalise the replicator equation as typically presented in the evolutionary 
game theoretical literature11. Consider an evolutionary game with n pure strategies and stage 
game pay-off ij!  for any i-player who meets any j-player. If ( )n1 p,...,pp =  is the frequency of 
each type in the population, the expected payoff for the i-player is then ( )
ij
n
j
ji
pp !! "
=
=
1
, and 
the average payoff in the game is ( ) ( )ppp i
n
i
j
!! "
=
=
1
. The replicator dynamic for this game is 
then given by: 
 
(4) ( ) ( )( )i i ip p p p .
.
! != "  
 
The replicator equation expresses the idea that strategies grow in the population if they do 
better than average; the strategies that do best grow fastest. One immediately sees that a Nash 
equilibrium is a stationary point in the dynamic system. Conversely, each stable stationary point 
is a Nash equilibrium and an asymptotically stable fixed point is a perfect equilibrium. 
In the context of equations (1), (2), and (3), the replicator dynamics will be represented 
by the two differential equations presented below: 
 
(5) ( )1 i 1 1
dp
p p
dt
.
! != = "  
(6) ( )2 2 2 2
dp
p p
dt
.
! != = "  
                                                
11 The mathematical formulation of the replicator dynamics is due to Taylor and Jonker (1978). For details, see also, 
Vega-Redondo (1996), Weibull (1996), and Gintis (2000). 
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where ( )1 1 2 2 1 2 31p p p p! ! ! != + + " "  is the average payoff in the population as a whole
12. 
From (5) and (6), it is clear that the rate of growth of the share of the population using strategies 1 
and 2 are proportional to the amount by which those strategies’ payoffs exceed the average payoff 
of the strategies in the population. 
 
3. Results 
Taken together, equations (5) and (6) constitute a system of first order differential 
equations.13 From these equations we have that: 
( )1
1
1 1
1 1
p
p
p p
.
! !
! !
" #"
= # +
" "
;
( )1
1
1
2 2
p
p
p p
.
! !" #"
=
" "
;
( )2
2
2
1 1
p
p
p p
.
! !" #"
=
" "
; and 
( )2
2
2 2
2 2
p
p
p p
.
! !
! !
" #"
= # +
" "
. Hence, from equations (1), (2), and (3) and the definition of ! , 
the Jacobian of 1 2p , p
. .! "
# $
% &
 at an arbitrary point ( )*2*1 p,p  is: 
 
(7) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 3 1 2 3* *
1 2 1 2
2 1 3 2 2 2 3
p p
J p , p p , p
p p
. . ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! !
" #$ + $ + $ +" #
= % &% & % &' ( $ + $ + $ +' (
 
 
In particular, we want to examine the stability of two equilibria: the case in which no 
corrupt agents are present, that is ( )0p,ap 21 ==  with [ ]1,0a! , and the case in which the 
population consists only of corrupt bureaucrats, that is ( )1p,0p 21 == .
14 The stability of these 
two equilibria is examined in the following sections. 
 
                                                
12 It can be easily verified that the population shares 
i
p  always add up to one and remain nonnegative under the 
replicator dynamics. 
13 It is “first order” because no derivatives higher than the first appear. It is “ordinary” as opposed to “partial” because 
we want to solve for a function of the single variable t, as opposed to solving for a function of several variables. 
14 The only remaining candidate for a stable equilibrium is ( )0p,0p 21 >= , consisting exclusively of corrupt and 
honest-enforcer players. We do not address this case here. 
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3.1 The Stability of the Non-corruption Equilibrium 
 
Proposition 1: The non-corruption equilibrium ( )0p,ap 21 ==  with [ ]1,0a! , i.e. no corrupt 
agents are present in the population, is local asymptotically stable if and only if: 
 
(8) 
! 
1"# " p
3
$( ) w + %( ) + # + p3$( ) wo " f( ) < w  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: The steady stable equilibrium ( )0p,ap 21 ==  with [ ]1,0a! , implies 
that 
31
!!! == . In this case, the Jacobian shown in (7) becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2 3 3 2* *
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1
a a 0 a
J p , p ( p , p )
0 0
. . ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! !
" " " " "# $ # $# $
= =% & % &% &
" "' ( ' ( ' (
. Hence, the 
determinant of the Jacobian is zero, which implies that one eigenvalue is zero and the other 
equals the trace of the Jacobian. Thus, the inequality 
12
!! <  is necessary and sufficient for 
local asymptotic stability, which, in turn, implies the condition in (8). Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 shows that the non-corruption equilibrium will be local asymptotically 
stable whenever the expected net benefits from behaving corruptly in a population that consists 
only of honest and whistle-blowing agents, i.e. 
! 
1"# " p
3
$( ) w + %( ) + # + p3$( ) wo " f( ) , are 
lower than the benefits from behaving honestly, i.e. the government salary, w . From this 
equilibrium condition, it can inferred that efficiency wages for government officials, ! , a high 
probability of being detected by the government, 
! 
" , and a high penalty for corrupt public 
officials,
! 
f , can imply significant expected costs of dismissal and so that the non-corruption 
equilibrium will be fairly stable and hard to break. By contrast, whenever the amount of the 
bribery, ! , and the salary the government official can get from the private sector if dismissed, 
0
w , are high in comparison with the salary paid by the government and the penalty for being 
caught in a corrupt activity the non-corruption equilibrium will not be very stable. 
In terms of the effect of whistle-blowing behaviour on the local asymptotically stability 
of the non-corruption equilibrium, it can be noted that in this case, the corrupt player confronts 
two expected costs: the expected costs from being detected by an external enforcing 
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governmental agency, ( )0w f! " , and the expected costs from being detected and reported to 
the government by a whistle-blower from within the organization, ( )3 0p w f! " . From this 
latter type of cost, typically absent in the traditional economic literature on corruption,15 it is clear 
that the stability of the non-corruption equilibrium crucially depends upon the population share 
ascribing to the whistle-blowing strategy, which allows us to highlight some basic remarks on the 
economics of whistle-blowing . 
Government organisations with a large population of honest bureaucrats that not only do 
not accept bribes but that also are willing to monitor and report corrupt behaviour ensure higher 
expected costs for corrupt agents than the baseline case in which whistle-blowing  is not a 
common practice. In this context, given a low probability of being detected by an external 
enforcing governmental agency and, therefore, low associated expected costs, the non-corruption 
equilibrium can still be local asymptotically stable due to the expected costs inflicted on corrupt 
agents by whistle-blowers. Indeed, if 0! " , the condition for the local asymptotic stability of 
the non-corruption equilibrium becomes: 
! 
1" p
3
#( ) w + $( ) + p3#( ) wo " f( ) < w . From this 
condition is clear that provided that the whistle-blowing population within the organization, 
! 
p
3
, 
is high enough to ensure that the expected costs to corrupt agents can still be higher than the 
expected net benefits from behaving corruptly in a population that consists only of honest agents, 
the non-corruption equilibrium can still be very stable. This implies that whenever honesty and 
whistle-blowing behaviour becomes a common practice, i.e. becomes a social norm; it can be 
very difficult to stop, even despite low probabilities of detection by external enforcing agencies. 
As the design of a successful external control and monitoring mechanism can be both 
difficult and costly, and in practice may imply a very low ! , it can be argued that the expected 
costs for corrupt agents resulting from being detected and reported to the government by a 
whistle-blower are always higher than the expected costs of being detected by an external 
enforcing governmental agency, that is ( ) ( )0 3 0w f p w f! "# < # . This implies that whistle-
blowing behaviour can indeed in some contexts be more efficient for deterring corruption than the 
typical government monitoring system. 
Finally, proposition 1 also points to the relevance of history and initial conditions when 
explaining the stability of the corruption or non-corruption equilibria. Indeed, as suggested in 
                                                
15 See for instance the recent survey on the economics of corruption by Aidt (2003). 
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previous works, such as those of Acemoglu (1995) and Tirole (1996), in this model, history is 
understood as the past behaviour of the member’s group and is an important determinant of the 
group’s current behaviour. Specifically, from condition (8) we can infer that a low initial 
population of whistle-blowers may imply that the non-corruption equilibrium, in which no 
corrupt agents are present in the population, may never be stable in some contexts. Why is it that 
this population of honest bureaucrats (who not only do not accept bribes but also are willing to 
monitor and report corrupt behaviour) can be initially small in some organizations and societies 
and very significant in others? What factors determine these diverse norms of behaviour in 
different organizations and societies? Clearly, to answer these questions, we have to consider the 
historical background in the analysis. What is clear, though, is that the current state of affairs 
must be necessarily analysed considering related events that occurred in the past and that 
somehow determine the present situation. Here, initial conditions are crucial and even small 
differences may imply widely differing outcomes.  
 
3.2 The Stability of the Corruption Equilibrium 
 
Proposition 2: The corruption equilibrium, 0
1
=p , i.e. all the population behaving corruptly, is 
local asymptotically stable if and only if: 
 
i) ( )( ) ( )( )0w 1 w w f! " !< # + + #  whenever ( ) ( )m 1 0! " #$ $ % , and 
ii) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0w m 1 1 w w f! " # $ % $+ & & < & + + &  whenever ( ) ( )m 1 0! " #$ $ > . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: The steady stable equilibrium ( )1p,0p 21 ==  implies that 0p3 =  and 
2
!! = . In this case, the Jacobian shown in (7) becomes 
1 2* *
1 2 1 2
3 1 3 2
0
J( p , p )( p , p )
. . ! !
! ! ! !
"# $
= % &" "' (
. The conditions for the Jacobian matrix to have a 
positive determinant and a negative trace are: (i) 0
21
<!""  and (ii) 0
23
<!"" . The former 
implies that ( )( ) ( )( )3 0w 1 w p w f! " ! #< $ + + + $ , as 0p3 =  we have that: 
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(9) ( )( ) ( )( )0w 1 w w f! " !< # + + #  
 
The latter implies that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 2 3 0w p m p 1 w p w f! " # $ % $ !+ & & < & + + + & , as 
1p2 =  and 0p3 = , we obtain: 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0w m 1 1 w w f! " # $ % $+ & & < & + + &  
 
Hence, we have two different cases to consider: 
 
Case i).  If ( ) ( )m 1 0! " #$ $ > , then equation (10) is the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for local asymptotic stability. 
Case ii).  If ( ) ( )m 1 0! " #$ $ % , then equation (9) is the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for local asymptotic stability Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 1: In the absence of any incentives to whistle-blowing  behaviour, 0! = , the 
corruption equilibrium, 0
1
=p , i.e. all the population behaving corruptly, is local asymptotically 
stable if and only if: ( )( ) ( )( )0w 1 w w f! " !< # + + # . 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: Whenever 0! = , the inequality ( )m 1 0!"# # <  is always satisfied. 
From proposition 2, this implies that ( )( ) ( )( )0w 1 w w f! " !< # + + #  is the only condition 
for the corruption equilibrium to be local asymptotically stable Q.E.D. 
 
From condition (i) in proposition 2, it is clear that the local asymptotical stability of the 
corruption equilibrium is contingent on the environment for whistle-blowing behaviour. If the 
costs associated with whistle-blowing are larger than or equal to the benefits, the corruption 
equilibrium can be very stable. Indeed, if the costs of monitoring a population of only corrupt 
agents and the transaction costs associated with actually reporting a corrupt government official, 
( )m 1!" + , are high in comparison with the expected benefits of whistle-blowing 
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behaviour,!" , then the condition for corruption stability will 
become: ( )( ) ( )( )0w 1 w w f! " !< # + + # . Corollary 1 also shows that, in the absence of 
incentives for whistle-blowers, 0! = , this inequality will be the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for local asymptotic stability. 
From this condition, it becomes clear that, if the probability of being detected by the 
government is rather small, the corruption equilibrium will be fairly stable and hard to break. In 
fact, if 0! " , the condition for the local asymptotic stability of the corruption equilibrium is 
always satisfied:w w !< + , which implies that whenever corruption becomes a common 
practice, it will be very difficult to stop. In the same way, if the amount of the bribery, ! , and the 
salary the government official can get from the private sector if dismissed, 
0
w , are high in 
comparison with the salary paid by the government, w , and the penalty for being caught in a 
corrupt activity, f , the corruption equilibrium will also be very stable. 
By contrast, increased salaries for government officials may break the stability of 
corruption. This argument dates back to Becker and Stigler (1974), who pointed out that 
efficiency wages can be used to control corruption since they increase the cost of dismissal and, 
therefore, make bureaucrats more reluctant to accept bribes16. Nevertheless, paying efficiency 
wages can be very expensive for governments and does not ensure that corruption will be reduced 
in all situations (see, for instance, Mookherjee and Png, 1995). In addition, if the probability of 
being detected by the government is rather small, the potential effect of efficiency wages on the 
stability of corruption is reduced, since the expected cost of dismissal also becomes very small. 
Likewise, an increase in the penalty for corrupt public officials can also break the 
stability of corruption. An interesting point to notice here is that if legal punishments for corrupt 
officials are high enough, then efficiency wages are not needed to reduce corrupt behaviour and 
break its stability as a norm of behaviour. Indeed, assuming that the penalty for corrupt behaviour 
is equal to the bribe, f != , and that the government only pays reservation wages, 
0
w w= , 
corruption will never be stable as long as the probability of being detected by the government is 
greater than or equal to 50%, that is 
1
2
! " . Here again, if the ability of the government to detect 
                                                
16 For favourable empirical evidence of this point see, for instance, van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). 
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corrupt officials is reduced, the impact of penalties and legal punishments in general in the 
stability of corruption will be quite limited as well. 
Again, as the design of a successful control and monitoring mechanism can be both 
difficult and costly, and in practice may imply a very low ! , this result helps explain why 
corruption, once it has become a common practice in a government, is very hard to stop and can 
even last for many years. 
However, key to this result was the assumption of an unfavourable environment for 
whistle-blowing behaviour, namely ( ) ( )m 1 0! " #$ $ % . What happens if this is not the case? 
Condition (ii) in proposition 2 shows that the corruption equilibrium will be local asymptotically 
stable whenever the expected net benefits from behaving corruptly in a population that consists 
only of corrupt players, i.e. ( )( ) ( )( )01 w w f! " !# + + # , are greater than the expected net 
benefits from behaving honestly and performing whistle-blowing activities, i.e. the government’s 
salary w  and ( ) ( )m 1! " #$ $ . 
This condition for the stability of corruption brings several new elements to the 
discussion. First, there are additional control instruments for the government to consider apart 
from the wage rate (w ),monitoring system (! ), and penalty ( f ) discussed above. These include 
the transaction costs associated with reporting a corrupt public official to the government, 0! > , 
monitoring costs, m 0! , and incentives for whistle-blowers that effectively detect and sanction a 
corrupt agent, 0! " . 
These alternative control instruments for the government imply new challenges in terms 
of policy. Here, for instance, it could be argued that all the countries that have formally 
established legal protection for whistle-blowers have reduced the transaction costs for whistle-
blowers to report corruption, which implies a lower ! . Similarly, more government transparency 
and freedom of information legislation points to reduced monitoring costs, which imply a lower 
m . Nevertheless, what is typically not seen as in policies against the establishment of corruption 
as a norm of behaviour in government are incentives for whistle-blowing behaviour. As shown in 
our model, this is clearly beyond legal protection for whistle-blowers, which only reduces the 
transaction costs for whistle-blowers to report corruption, indicating that whistle-blowing is not a 
bad thing but, on the contrary, something to reward. Hence, the first thing to consider is the 
common reaction to whistle-blowing. Whereas some people see whistle-blowers as selfless 
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martyrs for public interest and organizational accountability, others view them as “snitches”, 
solely pursuing personal glory and fame. Incentives to whistle-blowing behaviour should start 
with the government’s public recognition that reporting corruption is positive and should be 
encouraged at all levels. This message should be delivered not only to the people working within 
government institutions but also to the public in general. In addition to this, economic incentives 
should also play a part in encouraging whistle-blowing behaviour.17 However, this is a complex 
economic policy issue that, as we will see in the next section, can be difficult to design and apply, 
and if poorly implemented can contribute to the stability of corruption instead of its eradication. 
Second, from condition (ii) in proposition 2, we can also infer that if a whistle-blower can 
detect a corrupt public official with a probability greater than that of detection by an external 
agency from the government, that is !" > , then the effect of whistle-blowing on the stability of 
corruption could be quite significant, especially when considering that the more traditional 
control instruments available to governments for fighting corruption are extremely dependent of 
the ability of the government to detect corrupt officials. Clearly, a member inside the organization 
is more likely to spot corruption, and spot it at an earlier stage, than an external enforcing agency 
from the government. 
Third, whistle-blowing can certainly be cheaper than designing a successful control and 
monitoring mechanism or paying efficiency wages. In fact, if, for instance, the fines charged to 
corrupt public officials are paid as incentives to the whistle-blowers that detect them, that is 
f! = , then a monitoring system based on whistle-blowing can be both very effective and low 
cost for the government. 
Finally, as typically recognised in the literature, sometimes a “big push” is required in 
order to reduce the level of corruption in societies where it is epidemic (for details and further 
references see, for instance, Aidt, 2003). In the context of our model, this “big push” needed to 
break the stability of corruption can come from encouraging whistle-blowing behaviour in 
government institutions. Indeed, from condition (ii) in proposition 2, it follows that, given 
sufficiently large expected benefits from effectively reporting a corrupt agent, that is, the net 
value of the transaction and monitoring costs, ( ) ( )m 1! " #$ $ , the stability of corruption where 
                                                
17 Although this is not yet common practice, there are currently some examples, such as the HOPE Scholarship in 
Georgia, which provides four years of free tuition to a tech school or University in Georgia for children of 
whistleblowers or those researching government, corporate, or religious crimes. For details see: 
http://www.gsfc.org/hope/. 
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all the population behaves corruptly can be broken and, therefore, corruption will no longer be the 
social norm of behaviour within the organization. 
 
4. An Extension of the Model 
We now extend the model presented in the previous section by considering the case in 
which corrupt bureaucrats also ascribe to whistle-blowing behaviour. In order to model this type 
of behaviour, we modify the previous strategic setting by assuming that, within the government, 
there is a proportion of honest bureaucrats (
1
p ), another of corrupt whistle-blowing bureaucrats 
(
2
p ), and another of honest whistle-blowing bureaucrats ( 3p ). Consequently, we assume that the 
whistle-blowing bureaucrats can be either corrupt or honest (they may or may not accept bribes). 
 
The payoffs for each strategy type, given the new population composition, are: 
 
(11) 
1
w! =  
(12) 
! 
"
2
= 1#$ # p
3
%( ) w + &( ) + $ + p3%( ) wo # f( ) + p2% ' # (( ) #m p2( ) 
(13) ( ) ( )3 2 2w p m p! " # $= + % %  
 
From equations (11), (12), and (13), the Jacobian of 1 2p , p
. .! "
# $
% &
 at an arbitrary point 
( )*2*1 p,p  now becomes: 
 
(14) 
! 
J p
1
,
•
p
2
•" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' p1
*
, p
2
*( ) =
(
1
)( + p
1
)(
1
+ (
3( ) p1 )( 2 + ( 3( )
p
2
(
3
)(
1( ) ( 2 )( + * + ) ,( ) )
-m p
2( )
-p
2
+ (
3
)(
2
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
" 
# 
$ 
$ 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
' 
' 
 
It can be easily shown that the basic condition for the local stability of the non-corruption 
equilibrium, in which no corrupt agents are present, i.e., ( )0p,ap 21 == , with [ ]1,0a! , 
remains the same as before; that is 
! 
1"# " p
3
$( ) w + %( ) + # + p3$( ) wo " f( ) < w , see 
proposition 1. Hence, we will only focus on the condition for the local stability of the corruption 
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equilibrium, or the case in which the population consists only of corrupt bureaucrats, i.e., 
( )1p,0p 21 == . 
 
Proposition 3: The corruption equilibrium ( )1p,0p 21 == , i.e., all the population behaving 
corruptly, is local asymptotically stable if and only if: 
 
i) 
! 
w +" # $ %( ) $
&m 1( )
&p
2
< 1$'( ) w + (( ) + '( ) wo $ f( ) whenever 
! 
" # $ %( ) = m 1( ) >
&m 1( )
&p
2
 
and, 
ii) 
! 
w < 1"#( ) w + $( ) + #( ) wo " f( ) +% & " '( ) "m 1( ) whenever 
! 
" # $ %( ) =
&m 1( )
&p
2
> m 1( ) . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The steady stable equilibrium ( )1p,0p 21 ==  implies that 0p3 =  and 
2
!! = . In this case, the Jacobian shown in (14) becomes 
! 
J p
1
,
•
p
2
•" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' p1
*
, p
2
*( ) =
(
1
)(
2
0
(
3
)(
1
* + ) ,( ) )
-m p
2( )
-p
2
+ (
3
)(
2
" 
# 
$ 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
' 
. The conditions for the Jacobian 
matrix to have a positive determinant and a negative trace are: (i) 0
21
<!""  and (ii) 
! 
" # $ %( ) $
&m p
2( )
&p
2
+ '
3
$'
2
< 0 . The former implies that 
! 
w < 1"# " p
3
$( ) w + %( ) + # + p3$( ) wo " f( ) + p2$ & " '( ) "m p2( ) , as 1p2 =  and 0p3 = , 
we have that: 
 
(15) 
! 
w < 1"#( ) w + $( ) + #( ) wo " f( ) +% & " '( ) "m 1( ) 
 
The latter implies that
! 
w +" # $ %( ) $
&m p
2( )
&p
2
< 1$' $ p
3
"( ) w + (( ) + ' + p3"( ) wo $ f( ) , as 
1p2 =  and 0p3 = , we obtain: 
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(16) 
! 
w +" # $ %( ) $
&m 1( )
&p
2
< 1$'( ) w + (( ) + '( ) wo $ f( ) 
 
Hence, we have two different cases to consider: 
 
Case i).  If 
! 
" # $ %( ) = m 1( ) >
&m 1( )
&p
2
, then equation (16) is the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for local asymptotic stability. 
Case ii).  If 
! 
" # $ %( ) =
&m 1( )
&p
2
> m 1( ) , then equation (15) is the only necessary and sufficient 
condition for local asymptotic stability Q.E.D. 
 
From conditions (i) and (ii) in proposition 3, we can see that the effect that the mechanisms used 
to encourage whistle-blowing have on the local asymptotic stability of corruption depends on the 
nature of the monitoring costs within the organization. Whenever condition 
! 
m p
2( ) >
"m p
2( )
"p
2
 is 
satisfied, i.e., when monitoring costs exceed marginal monitoring costs, marginal monitoring 
costs are a diminishing function of the corrupt bureaucrat population; see Figure 1 (panel a) 
below.18 As marginal monitoring costs are bounded from above, the expected net benefits from 
detecting and reporting a corrupt bureaucrat do not need to be set very high in order to ensure that 
condition 
! 
" # $ %( ) = m p2( )  is satisfied. At the limit, where all the population behaves corruptly 
(
! 
p
2
=1) the condition 
! 
" # $ %( ) = m 1( ) >
&m 1( )
&p
2
 must hold. In this case, the economic incentives 
for whistle-blowers can be rather low and, hence, the level of corrupt bureaucrats ascribing to 
whistle-blowing behaviour can also be limited. This, according to condition (i), make the 
corruption equilibrium less stable, as can be easily inferred from the condition 
! 
w +" # $ %( ) $
&m 1( )
&p
2
< 1$'( ) w + (( ) + '( ) wo $ f( ), where the expected net benefits from 
                                                
18 In particular, in this case the monitoring costs function could be formally defined as follows: 
! 
m 0( ) = 0;
"m p
2( )
"p
2
> 0;
" 2m p
2( )
"p
2
2
< 0; and Limp2#$
"m p
2( )
"p
2
= 0 . 
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being a whistle-blower in a population of only corrupt agents, i.e., 
! 
" # $ %( ) $
&m 1( )
&p
2
, makes 
corrupt behaviour less attractive in economic terms and, therefore, the corruption equilibrium 
becomes less stable. 
By contrast, if condition 
! 
"m p
2( )
"p
2
> m p
2( )  is satisfied, that is, when monitoring marginal 
costs lie above monitoring costs, monitoring costs increase along with the population of corrupt 
bureaucrats, not being bounded from above. In other words, marginal monitoring costs are an 
increasing function of the corrupt bureaucrat population; see Figure 1 (panel b). In this case, in 
order to make whistle-blowing behaviour economically “attractive”, the expected net benefits of 
detecting and reporting a corrupt bureaucrat, 
! 
" # $ %( ), may have to be set very high. At the limit 
where all the population behaves corruptly, 
! 
p
2
=1, condition 
! 
" # $ %( ) =
&m 1( )
&p
2
> m 1( )  must 
hold. In this case, economic incentives for whistle-blowers may have to be set so high that many 
corrupt bureaucrats will ascribe to whistle-blowing behaviour, which, according to condition (ii), 
makes the corruption equilibrium more stable. This can be noted from condition 
! 
w < 1"#( ) w + $( ) + #( ) wo " f( ) +% & " '( ) "m 1( ), where the expected net benefits from 
being a whistle-blower in a population of only corrupt agents, i.e., 
! 
" # $ %( ) $m 1( ) , make 
corrupt behaviour more attractive in economic terms and, therefore, the corruption equilibrium 
becomes more stable. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 1: Examples of Monitoring Cost Functions 
 
On the Economics of Whistle-blowing Behaviour 
 23 
From proposition 3, it is clear that there are cases in which the governmental control 
instruments aimed at motivating whistle-blowing behaviour can be counter-productive, making 
corruption more stable within an organization. In particular, a high level of economic incentives 
for whistle-blowers can increasingly induce corrupt agents to become what we have called 
corrupt whistle-blowers; this, in turn, can make honest behaviour and honest whistle-blowing 
behaviour less economically attractive. 
According to proposition 3, in order to know in what contexts economic incentives for 
whistle-blowers can contribute more effectively to making corruption less stable within an 
organization, it is vital to understand the nature of monitoring costs. In particular, in contexts in 
which marginal monitoring costs are a diminishing function of the corrupt bureaucrat population, 
economic incentives for whistle-blowers can make corrupt behaviour less economically attractive 
and, therefore, the corruption equilibrium becomes less stable in the organization. By contrast, 
whenever marginal monitoring costs are an increasing function of the corrupt bureaucrat 
population, economic incentives for whistle-blowers can make corrupt behaviour more attractive 
in economic terms and, therefore, the corruption equilibrium in the organization becomes more 
stable. Consequently, a policy recommendation in order to adequately design economic 
incentives for whistle-blowers would be to investigate monitoring costs in different settings in 
detail. Clearly, this is a matter to be resolved empirically. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper developed a simple evolutionary game theoretic framework to investigate the role 
and potential impact of whistle-blowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations. We can 
draw several conclusions based on the results found herein. 
First, it is difficult for whistle-blowing behaviour to arise spontaneously in practice because 
this strategy is a costly activity and typically involves no economic rewards. The costs of whistle-
blowing include the monitoring and transaction costs associated with actually reporting a public 
official to the government. If we assume that the whistle-blowing bureaucrats are honest (do not 
accept bribes), it is clear that no payoff maximiser agent will be a whistle-blower, since this 
activity will only lower her payoff regardless of the whistle-blowing behaviour of the others. This 
implies that, in order to study this phenomenon, a non-optimising framework is required. Thus, 
we modelled corruption as a social norm of behaviour using an evolutionary game theoretic 
framework. 
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Second, we model corruption by assuming three basic types of behaviour within an 
organization: (i) honest behaviour; (ii) corrupt behaviour; and (iii) honest whistle-blowing 
behaviour. From this analysis, we conclude that the non-corruption equilibrium will be local 
asymptotically stable whenever the expected net benefits from behaving corruptly in a population 
that consists only of honest and whistle-blowing agents are lower than the benefits from behaving 
honestly, i.e., the government’s salary. It should be noted that, in this case, the corrupt player 
confronts two expected costs: the expected costs of being detected by an external enforcing 
governmental agency and the expected costs of being detected and reported to the government by 
a whistle-blower from within the organization. From this latter type of cost, typically absent in 
the traditional economic literature on corruption, makes it clear that the stability of the non-
corruption equilibrium crucially depends upon the initial population share ascribing to the 
whistle-blowing strategy, which allows us to infer some additional remarks. 
Government organisations with a large initial population of honest bureaucrats that not only 
do not accept bribes but that are also willing to monitor and report corrupt behaviour ensure 
higher expected costs for corrupt agents than a baseline case in which whistle-blowing is not a 
common practice. In this context, even if the probability of being detected by an external 
enforcing governmental agency and, therefore, the associated expected costs are rather small, the 
non-corruption equilibrium can still be local asymptotically stable due to the expected costs 
inflicted on corrupt agents by whistle-blowers. 
Our results also indicate the relevance of history and initial conditions when explaining the 
stability of the corruption or non-corruption equilibria. We conclude that a low initial population 
of whistle-blowers may imply that the non-corruption equilibrium, in which no corrupt agents are 
present in the population, may never be stable in the future in a specific organization. Clearly, in 
order to determine the causes of a low initial population of whistle-blowers, we have to consider 
the historical background in the analysis. In other words, the current state of affairs must be 
necessarily analysed considering related events that occurred in the past and somehow determine 
the present situation. Here, initial conditions are crucial and even small differences may imply 
widely differing outcomes. 
As the empirical evidence on whistle-blowing typically points out, in the real world, whistle-
blowing behaviour within organizations is the exception rather than the rule. This is consistent 
with low populations of whistle-blowers, which may help explain why it is so difficult for public 
organizations to avoid corrupt agents in the population and how corrupt activities can go on for a 
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long time without being detected or reported by public officials from inside the organization. 
Consequently, we also study different control instruments that governments could implement to 
motivate and promote whistle-blowing behaviour in an organization. 
In particular, we infer from our model that the local asymptotical stability of the corruption 
equilibrium is contingent on the environment for whistle-blowing behaviour. If the costs 
associated with whistle-blowing are greater than or equal to the associated benefits, the corruption 
equilibrium can become very stable. Indeed, if the costs of monitoring a population of only 
corrupt agents and the transaction costs associated with actually reporting a corrupt government 
official are high in comparison with the expected benefits of whistle-blowing behaviour, then 
corruption can be very hard to break. This can be especially so in the total absence of any 
incentives to whistle-blowers and whenever the probability of being detected by an external 
enforcing agency is rather small. 
By contrast, if the environment for whistle-blowing behaviour is rather favourable, then the 
corruption equilibrium will only be local asymptotically stable whenever the expected net 
benefits of behaving corruptly in a population that consists only of corrupt players are greater 
than the expected net benefits of behaving honestly and performing whistle-blowing activities. 
This condition for the stability of corruption brings several new elements to the discussion. 
Additional control instruments for the government to consider apart from the wage rate, the 
monitoring system, and the penalty include the transaction costs associated with reporting a 
corrupt public official to the government, monitoring costs, and incentives for whistle-blowers 
that effectively detect and sanction corrupt agents. Clearly, these alternative control instruments 
for the government imply new challenges in terms of policy, some of which were addressed in the 
paper. 
If the probability that a whistle-blower will detect a corrupt public official is greater than the 
probability of detection by an external agency from the government, then the effect of whistle-
blowing on the stability of corruption can be quite significant. This is especially true when 
considering that the more traditional control instruments available to governments for fighting 
corruption are extremely dependent on the ability of the government to detect corrupt officials. 
Clearly, an inside member of the organization is more likely to spot corruption, and spot it at an 
earlier stage, than an external enforcing agency from the government. 
All these economic variables can be very important for the government to consider as 
additional control mechanisms to promote whistle-blowing behaviour. Nonetheless, the potential 
On the Economics of Whistle-blowing Behaviour 
 26 
effect of these instruments on the stability of corruption is not so clear. In particular, we studied 
the stability of corruption when the economic mechanisms used to promote whistle-blowing 
behaviour in an organization also encourage corrupt players to “blow the whistle”. In order to 
model this effect, we deviated from the basic set-up and assumed the following types of 
behaviour within an organization: (i) honest behaviour; (ii) corrupt whistle-blowing behaviour; 
and (iii) honest whistle-blowing behaviour. This analysis showed that there are cases in which the 
government’s control instruments aimed at motivating whistle-blowing behaviour can be counter-
productive, making corruption more stable within an organization. Specifically, a high level of 
economic incentives for whistle-blowers can increasingly induce corrupt agents to become what 
we have called corrupt whistle-blowers, which, in turn, can make honest behaviour and honest 
whistle-blowing behaviour less economically attractive. 
Finally, we also show that, in order to know in what contexts economic incentives for 
whistle-blowers can contribute more effectively to make corruption less stable within an 
organization, it is crucial to understand the nature of monitoring costs. Thus, in contexts in which 
marginal monitoring costs are a diminishing function of the corrupt bureaucrat population, 
economic incentives for whistle-blowers can make corrupt behaviour less economically attractive 
and, therefore, the corruption equilibrium becomes less stable in the organization. By contrast, 
whenever marginal monitoring costs are an increasing function of the corrupt bureaucrat 
population, economic incentives for whistle-blowers can make corrupt behaviour more attractive 
in economic terms and, therefore, make the corruption equilibrium more stable in the 
organization. Consequently, a policy recommendation in order to adequately design economic 
incentives for whistle-blowers would be to investigate in detail monitoring costs in different 
settings. This is clearly a matter to be resolved empirically. 
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